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Notes
The DOJ’s Role in the Franchise No-Poach
Problem
MOLLY EDGAR†
In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a
joint policy statement which notified human resource professionals of antitrust issues that may
arise in the context of employee recruitment, hiring, and compensation. Among the various issues
that the Agencies addressed was the use of no-poach agreements by employers. The Agencies
stated that naked no-poach agreements, agreements between employers at different companies to
refuse to solicit or hire one another’s employees, are per se illegal under federal antitrust law.
Three years later, in a case involving a no-poach agreement, the DOJ filed a statement of interest
that departed from the seemingly bright-line rule set forth in its previous joint policy statement.
The DOJ took the position that the nature of the franchise system warrants an exception to the
general rule—that naked no-poach agreements among employers are per se illegal—and
suggested that the rule of reason analysis is the appropriate framework.
Since the DOJ issued its policy statement and subsequent statement of interest, federal district
courts have taken varying approaches to franchise no-poach cases. Most have declined to
determine the governing standard at the motion to dismiss stage due in part to the lack of
agreement between the DOJ and other authorities of antitrust law, including some state attorneys
general and the American Antitrust Institute. By adopting the per se standard, courts could easily
dispose of franchise no-poach cases and thereby conserve judicial resources and create
uniformity for litigants. The use of the per se standard to review franchise no-poach agreements
comports with existing antitrust precedent, and the DOJ’s contrary arguments mischaracterize
the nature of the franchise industry. Courts should decline to follow the DOJ’s reasoning in its
statement of interest and impose per se liability for franchises that use no-poach agreements.
Additionally, under the new administration, the DOJ should revisit the issue to reconcile its
position with Sherman Act jurisprudence and its own previous guidance and enforcement actions.

† J.D. Candidate 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Symposium Editor,
Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professor Samuel Miller and Professor Ryan Sandrock for teaching
the antitrust seminar that inspired this Note. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal staff for their
hard work and helpful feedback. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their endless support and
encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION
While antitrust law is not a remedy for resolving every societal ill,1 it is
undoubtedly an important tool for preventing anticompetitive conduct in the
labor market. In enacting the Sherman Act, Congress understood the broad
implications of corporate power, and Senator John Sherman, the namesake of
the law, warned that monopoly power can harm workers.2 Anticompetitive
conduct in the labor market produces the same three “evils” that animate
antitrust law: anticompetitive prices, lower quantities, and lower quality.3
Although antitrust law generally addresses anticompetitive conduct in
product markets, employers can act in ways that restrain trade in labor markets.4
Even if employers do not compete with one another in the same product market,
those same employers may compete with one another for employees in the labor
market.5 When employers enter agreements with one another and those
agreements restrain trade in the labor market, employers are subject to liability
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.6
In the past few years, antitrust enforcers at the federal and state levels have
become increasingly concerned with one particular type of agreement among
employers: no-poach agreements.7 No-poach agreements typically involve two
or more employers who agree to not hire one another’s employees.8 Although
no-poach agreements are similar to non-compete agreements with respect to
their potential effects on the labor market, no-poach agreements differ because
they are entered into by employers, and employees are not parties to the
agreement.9 In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) issued a joint policy statement (“2016 Joint Policy”),
directed at human resource professionals, that addressed no-poach agreements.10
The guidelines established that naked no-poach agreements among employers
1. Antitrust and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Com., and Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of Doha
Mekki, Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice) [hereinafter
Statement of Doha Mekki].
2. Id. at 1–2 (“[M]onopoly power . . . commands the price of labor without fear of strikes . . . .” (quoting
21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890)).
3. State Attorneys General, Comment on Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Competition and
Comsumer Protection in the 21st Century 2 (July 15, 2019), https://oag.dc.gov/sites/default/files/201907/State_AGs_Comments_to_FTC_on_Labor_Issues_in_Antitrust.pdf.
4. JOSÉ AZAR, IOANA MARINESCU & MARSHALL STEINBAUM, ANTITRUST AND LABOR MARKET POWER 3
(2019), https://econfip.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Antitrust-and-Labor-Market-Power.pdf.
5. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 2012c (4th and 5th eds. 2020).
6. Id.
7. See Donald J. Polden, Restraints on Workers’ Wages and Mobility: No-Poach Agreements and the
Antitrust Laws, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 579, 582 (2020).
8. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 2013a.
9. Id. ¶ 2013b.
10. See DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN
RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download [hereinafter 2016 JOINT
POLICY STATEMENT].
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constitute per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and may warrant
criminal liability.11 Although the DOJ and FTC’s position on no-poach
agreements appears clear from their 2016 guidance, an important question has
since emerged: whether that position extends to the franchise context.
This question came to the forefront three years after the DOJ’s joint
statement with the FTC—when the DOJ intervened in a 2019 case challenging
a franchise’s no-poach agreement (“Statement of Interest”).12 The DOJ argued
that, in the franchise sector, courts should evaluate the use of no-poach
agreements on a case-by-case basis because they are not necessarily per se
illegal.13 The Statement of Interest appears to depart from the 2016 Joint Policy
announced by the DOJ and FTC, the two federal enforcers of antitrust law.
Shortly after the DOJ filed its Statement of Interest, another key player in the
antitrust arena, the American Antitrust Institute, issued a letter in response.14 The
letter criticized the DOJ’s suggestion that franchise no-poach agreements should
be subject to the rule of reason and argued that these agreements are
anticompetitive, harmful to labor-market competition, and serve no legitimate
business purpose.15 Lacking clear guidance, federal courts in various districts
have taken inconsistent approaches in their review of franchise no-poach
agreements.16 Due to the significant number of franchise systems that use no-

11. Id. at 3–4.
12. See Corrected Statement of Int. of the United States, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244
(E.D Wash. Mar. 8, 2019), Richmond v. Bergey Pullman Inc., No. 218-cv-00246 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019),
Harris v. CJ Star LLC, No. 218-cv-00247 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019), ECF No. 34 [hereinafter DOJ’s Statement
of Interest].
13. Id. at 11–12, 16–17.
14. See Letter from Diana Moss, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., and Randy Stutz, Vice President, Am.
Antitrust Inst., to Hon. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., and Michael Murray, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (May 2, 2019), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/AAI-No-Poach-Letter-w-Abstract.pdf [hereinafter American Antitrust Institute
Letter].
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 795 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (holding
that the plaintiff stated a claim against the franchisees under the hub-and-spoke theory of violation); Arrington
v. Burger King Worldwide, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (finding that plaintiff failed to
state a claim because franchisees are not “separate economic actors for antitrust purposes”); Ogden v. Little
Caesar Enters., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 622, 630–35 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish
that no-poach agreements are per se unreasonable); Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207,
2019 WL 2247731, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019) (holding that plaintiff successfully pled an antitrust
violation but declining to determine the proper approach until further factual development); Fuentes v. Royal
Dutch Shell PLC, No. CV 18-5174, 2019 WL 7584654, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2019) (denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss for the Sherman Act claim because the plaintiff plausibly alleged a “horizontal” conspiracy);
Robinson v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., No. 19-9066 (SDW) (LDW), 2019 WL 5617512, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Oct. 31,
2019) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim for a Sherman Act violation but declining to determine the applicable
standard of review); In re Papa John’s Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:18-CV-00825-JHM, 2019
WL 5386484, at *7–10 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims of antitrust
violations).
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poach agreements,17 the standard that courts adopt to review these no-poach
agreements will inevitably affect millions of workers across the country.18
This Note will evaluate the DOJ’s arguments against the application of the
per se standard to no-poach agreements in the franchise context, illustrate the
problems with anticompetitive conduct in the labor market through a case
example, and ultimately advocate for courts to reject the DOJ’s position as it is
articulated in its Statement of Interest. To preserve competition in the labor
market and protect workers, courts should decline to follow the DOJ’s proposal
and instead apply the per se standard to evaluate no-poach provisions in
franchise agreements.
Part I of this Note discusses the current dispute regarding the appropriate
standard to evaluate no-poach agreements and identifies flaws in the DOJ’s
arguments in favor of the rule of reason standard. Part II will highlight the
Department of Justice’s departure from its previous position on the issue and its
role in shaping section 1 jurisprudence. Part III concludes this Note by
emphasizing important policy considerations underlying the debate regarding
the appropriate standard and why sound public policy requires either the per se
approach or legislation that bans these agreements entirely.

I. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE DOJ’S POSITION AND SECTION 1
JURISPRUDENCE
This Part first provides a background of section 1 jurisprudence to both
demonstrate how no-poach agreements operate in the franchise context and also,
to frame the dispute regarding the appropriate standard under which to review
these agreements. This Part will additionally outline the arguments in support of
the per se approach to franchise no-poach cases. Lastly, this Part addresses each
of the DOJ’s arguments in support of the rule of reason approach and highlights
the flaws in its reasoning.
A. BACKGROUND
To state a cause of action under section 1 of the Sherman Act,19 the plaintiff
must show: (1) there was an agreement, conspiracy, or combination between two
or more entities; (2) the agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade; and
(3) the restraint affected interstate commerce.20 To analyze whether an
agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade, courts analyze the agreement at

17. See Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing? A Burger-Joint Clause Offers a Clue, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/pay-growth-fast-food-hiring.html.
18. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 1.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
20. Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1996).
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issue under one of three standards: per se, quick look,21 or rule of reason.22 The
rule of reason is the default standard of analysis.23 Under the rule of reason
standard, after a plaintiff satisfies his burden to show the existence of an
agreement, market power, and a prima facie anticompetitive restraint on the
relevant market, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the
agreement’s procompetitive effects.24 The court then weighs the procompetitive
benefits of the agreement against its anticompetitive effects in the relevant
geographic and product market.25 On the other hand, if the agreement at issue is
so inherently anticompetitive, courts will depart from the default rule of reason
standard and apply the per se approach.26 If an agreement is deemed per se
unreasonable, the court will not consider any of the defendant’s purported
procompetitive justifications for the agreement.27
Both private parties and government enforcement agencies have invoked
section 1 of the Sherman Act to address the widespread use of no-poach
agreements in the labor market.28 These agreements involve two or more
entities, often competitors, that agree to not hire one another’s employees.29
Although this practice has been implemented in a variety of industries, including
technology30 and healthcare,31 it has become increasingly widespread in the
franchise industry.32 In this context, no-poach agreements are typically entered
into by the franchisor and individual franchisees. Private plaintiffs and state
enforcement officials have challenged these franchise agreements as unlawful

21. The quick look analysis is a truncated rule-of-reason analysis. It is appropriate when “an observer with
even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have
an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.” Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
Because the quick look analysis is a truncated form of the rule of reason, this Note does not separately analyze
a quick look approach to franchise no-poach agreements.
22. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1500.
23. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
24. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1914c.
25. See GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49.
26. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283–84 (2018); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979) (explaining that courts consider “whether the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output”
to determine whether an agreement is per se illegal).
27. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 7–9.
28. See Rochella T. Davis, Talent Can’t Be Allocated: A Labor Economics Justification for No-Poaching
Agreement Criminality in Antitrust Regulation, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 279, 302 (2018).
29. Id. at 281.
30. See Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Requires Six High Tech
Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-enteringanticompetitive-employee [https://perma.cc/Q55X-7AMY].
31. See Jeff Miles, The Nursing Shortage, Wage-Information Sharing Among Competing Hospitals, and
the Antitrust Laws: The Nurse Wages Antitrust Litigation, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 305 (2007).
32. Abrams, supra note 17.
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restraints of trade in violation of state antitrust laws33 and section 1 of the
Sherman Act.34
However, a dispute has emerged regarding the correct standard under
which these agreements should be evaluated. The DOJ argues that the rule of
reason standard, which is more favorable to defendants,35 should apply when nopoach agreements are implemented by franchise systems.36 Meanwhile, private
plaintiffs and state enforcement authorities argue that these arguments ignore
important realities about the nature of the franchise sector and the way in which
no-poach agreements operate in that context.37 By demonstrating the similarities
between no-poach agreements and other horizontal agreements that antitrust law
has long regarded to be per se unlawful, plaintiffs make compelling arguments
that the same standard should apply.
B. ARGUMENTS FOR THE PER SE APPROACH TO FRANCHISE NO-POACH
AGREEMENTS
Plaintiffs often analogize no-poach agreements to price-fixing agreements.
It is well-established in antitrust law that price-fixing agreements are per se
violations of section 1.38 Under antitrust law, buyers, like sellers, can be liable
for horizontal agreements that restrain trade.39 In this context, franchisees are
buyers of labor in the labor market, as they pay wages in exchange for labor.40
Challengers argue that franchisees that participate in these no-poach agreements
engage in a form of price-fixing by effectively suppressing wages.41 Analogous
to the way in which a firm may offer discounts to attract buyers to purchase its
products rather than a competitor’s products, firms may offer higher wages than
their competitors to attract employees.42 In labor markets free from artificial
restraints,43 firms are incentivized to maintain labor relations and employment
33. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, 14–15, Washington v. Jersey Mike’s Franchise Sys. Inc., No. 18-2-258227SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2018).
34. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 1, 38–39, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp.
3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 3:18-CV-00133).
35. See Clayton J. Masterman, Note, The Customer Is Not Always Right: Balancing Worker and Customer
Welfare in Antitrust Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1393–94 (2016).
36. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12.
37. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 17, Butler, 331
F. Supp. 3d 786 (No. 3:18-CV-00133).
38. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 305b.
39. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948) (holding that the
purchasers faced antitrust liability even though the sellers were injured, not necessarily the consumers).
40. RANDY M. STUTZ, AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE EVOLVING ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF LABOR-MARKET
RESTRAINTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 2 (2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf.
41. Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise
Sector 9 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Rels. Section, Working Paper No. 614, 2017), https://dataspace.princeton.edu/
bitstream/88435/dsp014f16c547g/3/614.pdf.
42. Id. at 16.
43. See Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that a labor market
is a market for antitrust purposes).
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practices that attract qualified employees. It is typically undisputed in these cases
that in order to provide quality customer service, franchisees seek qualified and
capable employees.44 Due to the lack of geographical exclusivity that is
characteristic of a typical franchise arrangement, franchisees compete with one
another to obtain these employees.45 If a qualified individual were to seek
employment with a franchisee, he or she may have multiple locations from
which to choose within a certain geographical region. The use of no-poach
agreements in the labor market eliminates the possibility that employees will
leave a firm to seek employment at a similar competing firm, thereby reducing
the pressure on firms to offer competitive wages. Challengers of no-poach
agreements argue that the use of these restrictive agreements in the franchise
industry has restrained competition for labor and thus disincentivized
franchisees from implementing practices to attract qualified employees.46
Antitrust law has recognized that agreements that restrict the supply of
labor in the market constitute a naked restraint on price and output.47 In FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, a group of lawyers agreed to refuse
to serve as court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants in order to
demand higher wages.48 The boycott created an artificial restriction on the
supply of labor in the legal services market.49 By reducing output of labor and
thus increasing the demand, the price of legal services increased.50 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the boycott amounted to a horizontal price fixing
arrangement because the boycott restrained the output of labor and increased its
price in the market.51 Accordingly, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals’
finding that the per se rules did not apply.52 Plaintiffs typically argue that nopoach agreements between franchisees similarly restrain the output of labor in a
given market.53 By preventing franchisees from hiring employees at other
locations within the same franchise system, the agreements restrict employee
mobility and thus limit the amount of available labor in the market at any given

44. For example, Jimmy John’s noted that franchisee staff are vital to its success and in order to keep
customers, Jimmy John’s franchisees must maintain a “high level of customer service.” Class Action Complaint,
supra note 34, at 14.
45. Id. at 15.
46. See, e.g., ALAN KRUEGER & ERIC POSNER, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS
FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 4–5 (2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_
income_workers_from_monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf.
47. See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 422–23 (1990).
48. Id. at 414.
49. Id. at 423.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 423.
52. Id. at 436.
53. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement at 8, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10 CV 1629, 2011
WL 10883994 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011) (No. 1:10-CV-01629).
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time.54 The restriction on labor output resultantly precludes wage negotiation
between employers and employees.55
The use of no-poach agreements in the franchise sector is also challenged
under the theory that the agreements amount to unlawful market-division
agreements, which are typically per se illegal.56 Horizontal market-division
agreements are agreements among actual or potential competitors not to compete
with one another in certain geographic areas, in offering certain products or
services, or in serving certain customers.57 Like naked horizontal price-fixing
agreements, market-division agreements are per-se unlawful under antitrust law
because they enable participants to reduce output in a market and increase
prices.58 Antitrust law does not treat employment markets differently from
product markets; therefore, “[a]n agreement among employers that they will not
compete against each other for the services of a particular employee or
prospective employee is, in fact, a service division agreement, analogous to a
product division agreement.”59 Under this view, by creating an artificial restraint
on an employee’s ability to seek employment at another franchisee, no-poach
agreements allocate available labor among competitors.60 Rather than allocating
customers in a particular market, which is widely recognized as per se illegal,61
the franchisees are allocating employees.
C. THE DOJ’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE RULE OF REASON APPROACH TO
FRANCHISE NO-POACH AGREEMENTS
Defendants in these lawsuits,62 and more recently, the DOJ,63 essentially
argue that no-poach agreements operate differently in the franchise context and
therefore require analysis under the rule of reason. In its Statement of Interest,
the DOJ argued that the rule of reason standard should govern no-poach
agreements in the franchise context because: (1) the parties to the franchise
agreement containing the no-poach provision are the franchisor and the
individual franchisee and therefore the agreement is vertical; (2) the franchisor
and the franchisee are treated as a single entity; and (3) the no-poach agreement
54. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 41, at 9.
55. No-Poach Approach: Division Update Spring 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2019/no-poach-approach (Sept. 30, 2019).
56. Michael Murray, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the Santa Clara
University School of Law 12–13 (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1142111/download.
57. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 2013b.
58. Id. ¶ 2030a.
59. United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 2013b).
60. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 2013a–b.
61. Id. ¶ 1652b.
62. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) at 2, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC,
331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 3:18-CV-00133) [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of
Their Motion to Dismiss].
63. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 11–12.
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is ancillary to a legitimate and procompetitive joint venture.64 These arguments,
addressed in Subparts 1 through 3, ignore important aspects of franchise systems
and should be rejected by courts.
1. Horizontal v. Vertical Restraint
Restraints under section 1 are generally categorized as either “horizontal”
or “vertical.”65 Horizontal restraints are agreements made among competitors at
the same level in a market.66 Vertical restraints are made between entities at
different levels of a supply chain, such as between a manufacturer and a
retailer.67 In order to successfully demonstrate a horizontal agreement, the
plaintiff must show that the parties to the agreement are competitors at the same
level in the relevant market.68 In the franchise sector, franchisees compete with
one another for not only customers but for employees.69 Owners of franchisees
generally enter franchise agreements with the understanding that franchisees are
not guaranteed exclusive, protected, or territorial rights in the market area of
their restaurant location.70 Franchise no-poach provisions are agreements among
competing franchisees to not hire each other’s employees and therefore fall
within the definition of horizontal agreements under section 1.
Proponents of the rule of reason standard, including the DOJ in its recent
Statement of Interest, disagree with challengers’ characterization of these
agreements. Defendants have attempted to distinguish the use of no-poach
agreements in the franchise sector from horizontal restraints of trade by
emphasizing that the agreements at issue are vertical.71 Under this view, because
the no-poach provisions are contained within the franchise agreement that is
entered into by the parent company franchisor and individual franchisees, the
parties to the agreement have a vertical relationship.72 Vertical agreements that
have procompetitive justifications are analyzed under the rule of reason
standard.73
The DOJ’s assertion that no-poach agreements are vertical is premised
upon a mischaracterization of the relationship between the franchisor and the
franchisee. While the relationship between the franchisor and franchisee is

64. Id. at 7, 11–12, 16.
65. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 (2007).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 890.
68. See Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 784 (1996).
69. For example, in its franchise agreement, Jimmy John’s explicitly informs prospective franchisees that
they will not only compete with other sandwich shop chains and fast-food restaurants, but even other Jimmy
John’s franchisees. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 15.
70. See, e.g., id.
71. DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 11.
72. Id. at 12.
73. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882, 884 (2007) (holding that the
defendant’s minimum resale price policy was vertical because it was an agreement between the manufacturer
and a retailer and therefore subject to the rule of reason analysis).
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vertical with respect to their product market, the individual franchisees are
horizontal competitors for workers in a labor market.74 The relationship at issue
is the relationship between franchisees at the same level in the market because
the agreement in question imposes restrictions on the franchisees’ labor and not
their products or services.75 Thus, a finding that no-poach agreements are
enforced horizontally and between franchisees at the same level in the market
cuts against the argument that the rule of reason is the appropriate standard for
courts to use. The most problematic aspect of the DOJ’s vertical agreement
argument is that it assumes that the orientation of the restraint, rather than the
effects of the restraint, dictates the outcome of which standard to use.76 Although
the distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements may be relevant in
identifying anticompetitive effects of the restraints,77 courts should avoid
narrowly focusing on the identities of the parties to an agreement when
determining the appropriate standard of review.
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court
explained that any “departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based
upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line
drawing.” 78 Applying the Court’s reasoning in Leegin, federal courts have
emphasized that when determining whether an agreement is horizontal or
vertical, courts must examine the effects of the restraint rather than the characters
that imposed it.79 In United States v. Apple, Inc., Apple argued that its pricefixing agreements with publishers were multiple independent vertical
agreements and thus should be subject to the rule of reason analysis.80 The
Second Circuit disagreed, finding that the vertical contracts between Apple and
the publishers were not the agreements that imposed a restraint of trade.81
Instead, the restraint of trade was created by the horizontal agreement, among
the publishers, that was organized by Apple for the purpose of eliminating
competition from another e-book distributor.82 Finding that the publishers,
through vertical agreements with Apple, engaged in a horizontal price-fixing
conspiracy, the court applied the per se rule.83
Similarly, no-poach agreements involve competing franchisees that engage
in a horizontal conspiracy by way of vertical agreements with the parentcompany franchisor. The restraint of trade results not from the contracts between
74. Antitrust and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Com., and Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3 (2019) (statement of Rahul
Rao, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of the Att’y Gen. of Wash., Antitrust Div.) [hereinafter Statement of Rahul Rao].
75. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 6.
76. Id.
77. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1503.
78. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 323 (2d Cir. 2015).
80. Id. at 321.
81. Id. at 325.
82. Id. at 321–29.
83. Id. at 325.

1584

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1573

the franchisor and the franchisee, but from each franchisee’s refusal to hire
employees from a competing franchisee.84 The argument to the contrary focuses
narrowly on the character of the parties to the agreement rather than the effects
of the agreement. The no-poach provision is only effectuated when two
competing franchisees try to hire or retain the same employee.85 If the agreement
was truly vertical in nature, as the DOJ suggests, it would have little practical
effect, which would render its existence useless. There is little functional
difference between the no-poach agreement entered into by the franchisor and
franchisee and a no-poach agreement between the individual franchisees.86
Because franchise no-poach agreements produce the same anticompetitive
effects on the labor market that a direct conspiracy between the franchisees
would likely produce, there is a strong argument that the per se rule is
appropriate.
Alternatively, the no-poach agreements in the franchise industry could be
viewed under the hub-and-spoke theory and thus still warrant per se liability. A
hub-and-spoke conspiracy involves a network of vertical agreements that are
used to facilitate a horizontal restraint of trade amounting to a horizontal
agreement.87 Hub-and-spoke conspiracies involve “both direct competitors and
actors up and down the supply chain,” and thus include both horizontal and
vertical agreements.88 If courts are reluctant to characterize some franchise nopoach provisions as purely horizontal agreements, courts should, alternatively,
view the use of these provisions as a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Applying the
hub-and-spoke theory to the franchise no-poach context, a franchisee enters into
an agreement with its parent-company franchisor and thereby creates a vertical
agreement. The no-poach provision, however, does not govern the vertical
relationship between those parties. Instead, the provision governs activity among
the individual competing franchisees and is enforced horizontally.89 Even if
courts disagree that no-poach agreements are purely horizontal, the horizontal
aspects of the no-poach agreements warrant the use of the per se rule.90

84. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9–12, 17, Butler v.
Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 3:18-CV-00133).
85. Statement of Rahul Rao, supra note 74, at 3.
86. Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45, 52 (2019).
87. In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merch., 798 F.3d 1186,
1192 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the
defendant entered into a network of vertical agreements with other manufacturers to restrict distribution to
certain warehouse stores).
88. In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1192.
89. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 2 (alleging that each franchisee has independent rights
of enforcement of the no-poach provision).
90. In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1191.
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2. Single-Entity Doctrine
Invoking the single-entity theory, the DOJ also suggested that a franchisor
and its franchisees may be considered a single entity for the purposes of
antitrust.91 There is no liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act where a
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of
interest and enter an agreement.92 According to this theory, because the
franchisor and franchisee are a single entity, they, by definition, cannot conspire
together to restrain trade.93
Courts must recognize the weaknesses of the single-entity defense as
applied in the franchise context. The theory applies in a narrow set of
circumstances; for example, to agreements between parent corporations and
their wholly owned subsidiaries.94 Courts can find guidance in American Needle,
Inc. v. National Football League, where the Supreme Court held that a joint
venture between substantial, independently owned, and independently managed
businesses is not immune from section 1 liability under the single-entity
defense.95 A group of National Football League (NFL) teams pooled together
their individual trademarks and other intellectual property in order to license
their rights through a joint venture.96 Although the teams participated in a joint
venture, the Court found that the teams operated through their own “separate
corporate consciousnesses” with individual objectives.97 The Court found that
because the NFL teams were separate economic actors, the single-entity doctrine
could not shield them from antitrust liability.98
Contrary to the DOJ’s argument, the single-entity doctrine is too narrow to
encompass the relationship between a franchisor and franchisees. Franchisees
are separate economic actors, independent not only from one another, but from
the parent company as well.99 The franchisees are not wholly owned subsidiaries
of the franchisor parent company.100 Franchisees, like the NFL teams in
American Needle, are independently owned and operated.101In their franchise
arrangements, many franchisors clarify that their franchisees are neither agents,
joint venturers, partners, nor employees of the parent company.102 Even more
91. DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 5–7.
92. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). However, courts will focus on
substance rather than form to determine whether two parties can conspire under section 1. See id. at 773 n.21.
93. Id. at 777.
94. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
95. Id. at 196.
96. Id. at 187.
97. Id. at 184.
98. Id. at 197, 204.
99. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 1; see also Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
¶ 6349(1)(a)(1) (2018) (“[T]he franchisee is an independent businessman . . . .”).
100. John A. Capobianco, Note, In Restraint of Wages: The Implications of “No-Poaching” Agreements,
33 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 419, 436 (2019).
101. Jimmy John’s, for example, makes clear to its franchisees that they are responsible for their own dayto-day operations. Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 13.
102. See, e.g., id. at 13.
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relevant here is that franchisors often play no role in the employment practices
or labor relations of the franchisees.103 Franchisors do not set or regulate
franchisee costs of operation, including wages for employees.104 In a typical
arrangement, franchisors also do not control the hiring of employees, training,
promotions, terminations, hours worked, employee benefits, or working
conditions within franchisees.105
Courts should receive DOJ’s single entity argument with skepticism. The
argument that the franchisor and its franchisees are so intertwined that they
cannot conspire with one another finds little support in reality. Courts should
look to the governing agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee and
evaluate the extent to which each franchisee is given autonomy and
independence in operating its business. Franchisees that retain a significant
amount of responsibilities, control, and discretion in the operation of the
business should not be immune from antitrust liability for its agreements with
its parent company.
3. Ancillary Restraint v. Naked Restraint
Although the DOJ advanced several arguments against the application of
the per se rule, the dispute regarding which standard should govern is likely to
turn on the issue of whether these restraints are naked or ancillary. Even if the
existence of a horizontal agreement between competitors were established, the
court would also need to determine whether the restraint on trade is “naked” or
“ancillary.”106
A horizontal agreement is considered a naked restraint on trade if it has the
purpose or likely effect of increasing price or decreasing output and is unrelated
to joint economic activity between parties.107 Naked restraints on trade are
presumed anticompetitive and are thus per se illegal.108 Once the court concludes
that the restraint at issue is naked, no further inquiry into the merits of a
particular restraint is necessary.109 In its earlier policy statement with the FTC,
103. See Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation for the Fissured Economy, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907,
934–36 (2018) (discussing the lack of control that franchisors exercise over franchisees with respect to day-today operations and franchisee employees); see also Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 740–42
(Cal. 2014) (holding that plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence that franchisor Domino’s controlled the
day-to-day aspects of its franchisee’s employment and employee conduct).
104. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 17; see also Lydia DePillis, Why Franchises Are
Such a Huge Obstacle to Higher Wages, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2013, 11:26 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/12/06/why-franchises-are-the-biggest-obstacle-tohigher-wages/ (discussing franchisor’s ability to “abdicate responsibility for wages and working conditions” at
its franchisee workplaces).
105. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 17; Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 450 (5th Cir.
2014) (finding insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the franchisor supervised or controlled franchisee’s
employee work schedules or conditions).
106. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1906.
107. Id. ¶ 1906a.
108. Id. ¶ 1910.
109. Id. ¶ 1910b.
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the DOJ stated that the per se rule applied where the no-poach agreements were
“naked,” or “separate from or not reasonably necessary to a larger legitimate
collaboration between the employers.”110
A restraint is ancillary if its objectively intended purpose or likely effect is
lower prices, increased output, or is an otherwise profitable or rational decision
for the participants.111 To be ancillary, an agreement must be subordinate or
collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction.112 The agreement must be
reasonably necessary to facilitate the main transaction in accomplishing its
broader purpose.113 Although not all ancillary agreements are lawful, there is a
strong presumption that they do not violate antitrust law.114
Applying the ancillary restraint doctrine, the Supreme Court in Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. applied the rule of reason
standard although the agreements at issue were horizontal.115 Broadcast Music
involved a blanket licensing agreement whereby copyright owners of musical
compositions licensed their compositions collectively.116 By purchasing the
blanket license, licensees could publicly perform any of the works included in
the license rather than negotiate rights individually with each copyright
owner.117 The Court found that the defendants’ blanket license was reasonably
ancillary to a legitimate business transaction because it increased market
efficiencies.118 The business venture required a certain degree of cooperation
between competitors and the restraint was necessary to facilitate that
cooperation.119 Unlike a naked restraint that is presumed to have no
procompetitive justifications, ancillary restraints like the license in Broadcast
Music warrant a more comprehensive rule of reason analysis to determine
section 1 liability.120
In its Statement of Interest, the DOJ invoked the ancillary restraint doctrine
and argued that, like the blanket license in Broadcast Music, some franchise nopoach agreements are reasonably necessary to the franchise collaboration and
yield legitimate benefits.121 According to its theory, by limiting intrabrand
competition, no-poach agreements may actually foster interbrand
competition.122 The no-poach agreements can ensure uniformity of the
franchise’s brand and quality of service, which is necessary for a franchise

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 3.
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 1905.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1912.
Id.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 15 (1979).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 3.
Id. at 12.
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system’s success.123 Interbrand competition is encouraged because,
theoretically, it yields benefits to consumers.124
However, the argument that the no-poach agreements are ancillary because
they provide potential benefits to consumers overlooks a key issue. The nopoach agreements restrain trade in the labor market, not the product market that
the franchisees serve.125 By limiting output in the labor market, the no-poach
agreements directly affect employees, not consumers.126 To determine whether
a restraint may offer procompetitive effects, the court should consider
procompetitive effects in the market in which the restraint directly occurs.127
Here, the restraint caused by no-poach agreements directly occurs in the labor
market, not the product market.128 Thus, the court should examine the benefits,
or lack thereof, of a restraint on employees in the labor market. Even if
defendants can show that these agreements promote interbrand competition in
the product market, this would be an out-of-market benefit that would not excuse
the restraint at issue.129
Additionally, unlike the cases in which courts applied the ancillary restraint
doctrine, franchise no-poach cases do not involve an industry in which
restrictions on competition are essential for its existence. For example, courts
have recognized that unusual business ventures like group music licensing and
sports leagues require cooperation among competitors.130 The DOJ failed to
explain why a restraint on labor market competition is necessary for franchisees
to produce their products and services.131 Franchise defendants have argued that
no-poach agreements protect franchisees’ investments in providing specific
training for its workers. In an industry with a high turnover rate, franchisees use
these agreements to ensure that the net returns from training shift in the direction
of the employer.132 This argument fails to prove or explain how the training
would be lost to the franchisees without the use of no-poach agreements. If this
argument were true, it would essentially concede that franchisees are in fact
separate economic actors, cutting against the single-entity theory. If the
franchisees were a single entity operating under one brand, as rule of reason
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 3.
126. Id.
127. Masterman, supra note 35, at 1414.
128. Id.
129. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 8.
130. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
131. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12. While the DOJ argued that no-poach agreements could
qualify as ancillary restraints if they are reasonably necessary to a legitimate joint activity, it did not explain why
these restraints are necessary to the franchise agreement. See id. at 13, 16–17.
132. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) at 8, 14, Butler v. Jimmy John’s
Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 3:18-CV-00133) [hereinafter Defendants’
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint].
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proponents have argued, an employee who benefits from the training provided
by one franchisee could transfer those same skills to another franchisee without
the risk of the franchise brand losing its investments.
Additionally, no-poach provisions are not ancillary because they are not
reasonably necessary to effectuate the broader purpose of the franchise
agreement. To constitute an ancillary restraint, the restraint must be reasonably
tailored to further pro-competitive justifications.133 The DOJ failed to
demonstrate how no-poach provisions could be considered reasonably tailored
to achieve the purported procompetitive benefits. It offered no evidence to
suggest that the survival of a franchise system depends upon retaining
employees and decreasing turnover. In fact, there is evidence suggesting
otherwise. Following a series of investigations and civil settlements, 150
companies in the state of Washington have removed no-poach provisions from
their franchise agreements.134 Additionally, a minority of franchise systems in
Washington did not use these no-poach agreements to begin with.135 If the
purported purpose of the no-poach agreements were to maintain brand
uniformity and increase interbrand competition, it is likely that the franchise
model could achieve this goal without restraining competition in the labor
market.136
There are more efficient and procompetitive means to protect franchisees’
investments in employees. Employers can offer bonuses for employees who stay
with the franchisees for a certain amount of time. Additionally, employers can
offer competitive wages that attract and retain qualified employees. These are
just a few examples of solutions that employers can implement to avoid
employee turnover and a loss of investment—the consequences that the nopoach agreements purportedly prevent—and also contribute to a competitive
labor market. Just as firms make investments and developments in their products
in order to attract consumers and compete in the product market, employers must
create and maintain conditions that attract employees in the labor market.
The DOJ’s arguments in support of rule of reason are grounded in a
mischaracterization of the franchise system and fail to explain why an
employer’s involvement in a franchise system warrants a departure from existing
section 1 precedent. Although the reasoning in its Statement of Interest is subject

133. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006).
134. Statement of Rahul Rao, supra note 74, at 2–3.
135. Id.
136. “The economic underpinnings of franchising center around brand names and the public’s perception of
quality and uniformity associated with those brand names.” David J. Kaufmann, Felicia N. Soler, Breton H.
Permesly & Dale A. Cohen, A Franchisor Is Not the Employer of Its Franchisees or Their Employees, 34
FRANCHISE L.J. 439, 453 (2015). Franchisors can take a variety of measures to ensure that the quality of its
goods and services are uniform among franchisees and promote the franchise brand. See id. at 454–55.
Franchisors can ensure high quality products by prescribing rigorous production standards with which
franchisees must comply. Additionally, franchisors can ensure brand uniformity by prescribing standards for a
franchisee location’s physical appearance, employee uniforms, and use of its trademarks. See id.
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to criticism, the DOJ provided defendants additional support to use as leverage
in recent no-poach cases.

II. THE DOJ’S INCONSISTENT POSITIONS
The DOJ has weighed in on the issue of no-poach agreements twice in the
past decade: first in 2016 in its joint policy statement with the FTC,137 and again
in 2019 when the DOJ filed a statement of interest in a no-poach case to which
it was not a party.138 As more no-poach agreements become the subjects of
litigation, courts will likely consider the extent to which the DOJ’s guidance on
the matter should shape the outcome.
A. 2016 DOJ AND FTC JOINT POLICY STATEMENT
The DOJ and FTC are joint enforcers of federal antitrust law.139 In October
2016, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC published a joint policy
statement titled Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals.140 In this
statement, the DOJ and the FTC established important guidelines for antitrust
compliance in the labor market. Specifically, the statement established that
naked no-poach agreements among employers are per se illegal and may be
subject to criminal prosecution under section 1 of the Sherman Act.141 First
stating that firms that compete for employees are considered competitors under
antitrust law, the DOJ and the FTC then plainly state that “naked wage-fixing or
no-poaching agreements among employers, whether entered into directly or
through a third-party intermediary, are per se illegal under the antitrust laws.”142
The use of naked no-poach agreements in the franchise sector is the type of
conduct the DOJ and FTC appears to condemn in its 2016 Joint Policy statement.
Through their policy statement, the DOJ and FTC intended to put firms, like
franchise systems, on notice that such agreements are per se illegal.143
B. PRIOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE DOJ
Both before and after the DOJ communicated its position in the 2016 Joint
Policy, its civil enforcement efforts have utilized the per se approach to
challenge no-poach agreements.
Under the Obama Administration, the DOJ investigated the employment
and recruitment practices of several technology companies in the Silicon Valley.
After concluding that the firms entered agreements that were per se illegal under

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See 2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10.
See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12.
2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 3–4.
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antitrust law, the DOJ brought a civil suit against the companies in 2010.144 The
competing firms expressly agreed to not solicit current employees of the other
firms involved in the bilateral agreement.145 The DOJ concluded that these
agreements were facially anticompetitive and “disrupted the normal pricesetting mechanisms that apply in the labor setting.”146 For this reason, the DOJ
characterized this agreement as a naked restraint of trade under antitrust law.147
To settle the matter, the defendant firms agreed to refrain from enforcing or
entering into similar no-poach agreements.148
In 2019, the DOJ, under the Trump Administration, filed a civil complaint
against two rail equipment suppliers for implementing and maintaining a longrunning no-poach agreement.149 The DOJ noted that the agreement technically
warranted criminal charges, but, in an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the
Agency decided to pursue only civil violations for no-poach agreements entered
into before its 2016 Joint Policy announcements.150 The DOJ argued that the nopoach agreements were per se illegal because they substantially reduced
competition for employees and were not necessary to a legitimate business
transaction.151
Although the DOJ followed through with its communicated intention to
challenge no-poach agreements as per se illegal, the DOJ’s warning of criminal
enforcement has remained only a warning. The DOJ’s 2016 Joint Policy
provided that naked no-poach agreements are subject to criminal prosecution.152
The DOJ further emphasized the potential in 2017 when then-DOJ Antitrust
Division chief Makan Delrahim announced that criminal no-poach enforcement
was a “high priority” for the department.153 Despite these announcements, the
DOJ has yet to bring a criminal no-poach case.154 The DOJ’s position on no144. Complaint at 2, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10 CV 1629, 2011 WL 10883994 (D.D.C. Mar.
18, 2011) (No. 1:10-CV-01629).
145. Id. at 4–8.
146. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 53, at 10.
147. Id. at 2–3.
148. Adobe Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 10883994, at *1–2.
149. Complaint at 2, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-CV-00747-CKK, 2018 WL 4386565,
(D.D.C. July 11, 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-00747).
150. Matthew Perlman, Employees Sue Knorr, Wabtec After DOJ No-Poach Settlement, LAW360 (Apr. 16,
2018, 8:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1033813/employees-sue-knorr-wabtec-after-doj-no-poachsettlement.
151. Complaint, supra note 149, at 11.
152. 2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 2.
153. See Bryan Koenig, Where Are the No-Poach Prosecutions DOJ Promised?, LAW360 (Oct. 3, 2019,
6:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1205315.
154. Id. As this Note was going to print, the DOJ filed criminal charges against an outpatient medical facility
for its alleged use of no-poach agreements. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Health Care Company Indicted
for Labor Market Collusion (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/health-care-company-indicted-labormarket-collusion. This is the first and only time that the DOJ has brought criminal charges related to no-poach
agreements. Matthew Perlman, DOJ Targets UnitedHealth Unit for Criminal No-Poach Pacts, LAW360 (Jan. 7,
2021, 5:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1342573/doj-targets-unitedhealth-unit-for-criminal-nopoach-pacts. Although this case does not arise in the franchise context, its outcome may shed light on how the
DOJ, under new leadership, may approach franchise no-poach agreements in the future.
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poach agreements, as articulated in policy statements and public
announcements, now appears less emphatic due to the lack of criminal
prosecutions and its 2019 Statement of Interest.
C. IMPACT OF THE DOJ’S STATEMENT OF INTEREST
In tension with its previous civil enforcements and official policy
statements, the DOJ recently argued that some well-established antitrust
principles regarding the use of no-poach agreements do not apply in the
franchise sector.155 This position, albeit flawed, now forms one of the bases of
the franchise defendants’ arguments in no-poach litigation.156 In 2016, the DOJ
seemed to clearly articulate its position regarding enforcement of no-poach
agreements in the labor market.157 Three years later, in three private civil cases,
the DOJ filed a statement of interest in which it advocated for a different
approach to examine no-poach agreements when they are used in the franchise
sector.158 In its Statement of Interest, the DOJ argued that a court must examine
each franchisor-franchisee relationship on a case-by-case basis in order to
determine which legal standard should apply.159 The DOJ’s argument relies
upon the ancillary restraint doctrine, which, as previously discussed, should not
apply to the use of no-poach agreements in the franchise sector.
The DOJ’s Statement of Interest received the attention and criticism of
other key players in antitrust law, signaling a disagreement regarding the
appropriate standard under which franchise no-poach agreements should be
analyzed. Due in part to this disagreement in the antitrust community, courts
have relucted to issue broad pronouncements regarding the appropriate standard
of review for franchise no-poach agreements.
1.

Responses to the DOJ’s Statement of Interest

In response to the DOJ’s Statement of Interest, the American Antitrust
Institute expressed its concern that the DOJ’s position will misguide district
courts and discourage antitrust plaintiffs from challenging these no-poach
agreements.160 It communicated its position that no-poach agreements in the
franchise industry will inevitably harm labor market competition and have no
identifiable efficiencies that would warrant the application of the rule of reason
standard.161

155. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12, at 11.
156. See, e.g., Bryan Koenig, Jimmy John’s Cites DOJ’s No-Poach Ammo in Dismissal Bid, LAW360 (Mar.
15, 2019, 10:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1139458/jimmy-john-s-cites-doj-s-no-poach-ammo-indismissal-bid.
157. 2016 JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 3.
158. See DOJ’s Statement of Interest, supra note 12.
159. Id.
160. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 1.
161. Id. at 2.
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The DOJ’s statement also prompted criticism from the antitrust
subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives. In a letter sent to
Makan Delrahim, then-chief of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, subcommittee
chairman Representative David Cicilline expressed concern regarding the
division’s increased involvement, by way of amicus briefs and statements of
interests, in cases where the United States is not a party.162 The letter noted that
the “Division’s decision to intervene has risked undermining enforcement
efforts by state attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission, raising
serious questions about the Division’s motives and judgment.”163 The letter
singled out the DOJ’s Statement of Interest with regard to no-poach agreements
in franchising contracts and cited to “numerous experts and scholars” who have
rejected the DOJ’s position, while also acknowleding its contradiction with
previous statements the DOJ made regarding labor market restraints.164 Finally,
the subcommittee argued that the DOJ’s “decision to interfere in order to win
greater protection for corporate franchisors that restrict labor market
competition . . . reflects grossly misshapen priorities.”165
2.

Case Example: Jimmy John’s

The shift in the DOJ’s position on no-poach agreements has left courts
reluctant to determine which standard is appropriate when reviewing no-poach
agreements and has provided support to defendants in these actions.166 A recent
case, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, illustrates the nature of no-poach
agreements and their implications in the franchise sector.167 This case, still
ongoing in district court, is emblematic not only of a typical no-poach provision
in a franchise agreement but also of the lack of clarity regarding the appropriate
standard of review for these agreements.
Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC (“Jimmy John’s”) is the franchisor of the
Jimmy John’s system.168 Jimmy John’s is a sandwich store chain with over 2,700
locations in over forty states.169 The franchise restaurants employ tens of

162. Letter from David N. Cicilline, Chairman, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., & Admin. Law, U.S. House
of Reps., to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1 (May 22, 2019),
https://cicilline.house.gov/sites/cicilline.house.gov/files/documents/DOJ_05222019.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2–3.
165. Id. at 4.
166. In several franchise no-poach cases, the courts have declined to decide, at the motion to dismiss stage,
the appropriate standard of review to apply in the case. See, e.g., Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331
F. Supp. 3d 786, 797 (S.D. Ill. 2018); Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207, 2019 WL
2247731, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019); Fuentes v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, No. CV 18-5174, 2019 WL
7584654, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2019); Robinson v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., No. 19-9066 (SDW) (LDW), 2019
WL 5617512, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2019); In re Papa John’s Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No.
3:18-CV-00825-JHM, 2019 WL 5386484, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019).
167. See Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786.
168. Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 1.
169. Id.
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thousands of workers across the United States.170 Jimmy John’s enters into
franchise agreements with franchise owners, and each franchise is an
independently owned and operated business.171
Franchise restaurants are responsible for their own day-to-day operations,
including all employment practices.172 In its franchise agreement, Jimmy John’s
specifically clarifies that it plays no role in the franchisees’ employment
practices or labor relations.173 Beginning no later than 2012, and likely back to
at least 2007, the Jimmy John’s franchise agreement contained a provision that
required each franchisee to agree to not “hire as an employee” any person who
currently is, or within the preceding twelve months was, employed by another
Jimmy John’s franchisee.174 Additionally, franchisee employees were restricted,
“as a condition of their employment,” from hiring employees from other Jimmy
John’s franchisee restaurants.175 Franchise agreements executed in 2015, 2016,
and 2017 contained a provision prohibiting franchisees from soliciting or
initiating recruitment of other franchisees’ employees.176 These contracts also
explicitly indicate that the franchisees are “third party beneficiaries” of the
agreement and have independent rights of enforcement.177 When entering into
the franchise agreements, franchisees agreed to pay $50,000 for each violation
of the no-poach provision.178 Additionally, Jimmy John’s reserved the right to
terminate a franchise agreement entirely for violation of the no-poach
provision.179
The plaintiff in this case, Sylas Butler, was a part-time employee at a
Jimmy John’s restaurant location in Illinois.180 During his time working at the
restaurant, Butler was paid minimum wage.181 In January 2017, after Butler’s
supervising manager reduced his hours per week, Butler quit his job at that
particular restaurant in order to obtain employment at a different location that
could offer him more hours.182 Butler was not eligible for hire at any other
Jimmy John’s location because of the existing no-poach agreements among
franchise locations.183
In January of 2018, Butler filed a class action lawsuit against Jimmy John’s
in Illinois federal district court.184 He alleged that Jimmy John’s no-poach
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 3, 5.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1.
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agreements violate section 1 of the Sherman Act and that he suffered suppressed
wages and diminished employment opportunities as a result of the defendant’s
anticompetitive conduct.185
Jimmy John’s moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that the
plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit, and, alternatively, that he failed to
state a plausible section 1 claim.186 It argued that intrabrand no-hire agreements
are not per se unlawful and are instead subject to the rule of reason analysis.187
Jimmy John’s reasoned that because the franchise agreements are between
Jimmy John’s—the franchisor —and its franchisees, the agreements are vertical
and are thus not subject to per se liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act.188
Jimmy John’s argued that even if the plaintiff’s claim could proceed under
the rule of reason test, it would ultimately fail.189 Under Jimmy John’s theory,
procompetitive justifications for no-poach agreements outweigh any alleged
potential harm.190 According to its argument, franchisees invest significant
resources in hiring, training, and retaining employees.191 Preventing employees
from “free-riding” at the franchise level within the Jimmy John’s system protects
these investments and promotes Jimmy John’s products, thereby encouraging
interbrand competition with other fast-food franchises outside of the Jimmy
John’s brand.192
The district court rejected Jimmy John’s argument that the plaintiff lacked
standing to bring the suit and allowed the case to proceed.193 However, the court
declined to decide which standard of review should apply because it was too
early to decide.194 The judge noted that plaintiffs would have to provide
“Herculean” evidence of franchise independence to invoke the per se
standard.195 In a second attempt to dismiss the lawsuit, Jimmy John’s relied upon
the DOJ Statement of Interest which advocated for the rule of reason
approach.196 With a new judge presiding, the court once again denied Jimmy
John’s motion to dismiss and declined to conclude the appropriate standard of
review, noting that “the legal questions here are in their infancy, and this battle
looks like one that will make its way through the courts for years to come. This

185. Id. at 34–35.
186. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, supra note 62, at 1.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1–2.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 786, 793, 795 (S.D. Ill. 2018).
194. Id. at 797.
195. Id.
196. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, supra note 132, at 2.
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case in particular may end up being the vanguard in that battle.”197 The litigation
involving Jimmy John’s is still ongoing in district court.
As articulated by the judge in Butler v. Jimmy John’s, courts appear
reluctant to determine the appropriate standard at the motion to dismiss stage as
they grapple with the unresolved issue.198 The DOJ’s recent Statement of
Interest, and its apparent departure from its previous guidance and enforcement
efforts, likely contributed to the lack of clarity on that point.
3.

Varied Approaches to No-Poach Litigation

The disagreement among key players in the world of antitrust law signals
uncertainty for the future of no-poach agreements in the franchise industry. This
uncertainty is reflected in recent cases in which federal district courts across the
nation grappled with the issue. Six courts, including the court in Butler v. Jimmy
John’s, concluded that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged horizontal restraints
of trade but nevertheless declined to resolve the issue of the appropriate standard
at the motion to dismiss stage.199 A federal district court in Michigan, however,
agreed with the defendant and applied the rule of reason standard at the motion
to dismiss stage, where it ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for
failure to sufficiently allege an unreasonable restraint.200 Another court
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint after holding that the single-entity doctrine
applied and thus precluded section 1 liability.201
The extent to which the DOJ’s positions on the issue influenced the courts’
analyses in these franchise no-poach cases is unclear. In many of these cases,
the plaintiffs relied upon the DOJ and FTC 2016 Joint Policy to support their
contention that the per se rule should apply to their claims. The DOJ’s 2019
Statement of Interest provided defendants with a tool to not only undermine the
plaintiff’s use of the 2016 guidance but also advance their arguments that the
rule of reason is the appropriate standard.202 Although the DOJ’s statements in
the 2016 Joint Policy and its subsequent 2019 Statement of Interest are not
binding on courts, the DOJ’s guidance on antitrust law is considered persuasive
authority.

197. Conrad v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No. 318CV00133NJRRJD, 2019 WL 2754864, at *3 (S.D.
Ill. May 21, 2019).
198. See supra note 166.
199. See Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 797.; Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, No. 18-13207, 2019
WL 2247731, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2019); Fuentes v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, No. CV 18-5174, 2019 WL
7584654, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2019); Robinson v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., No. 19-9066 (SDW) (LDW), 2019
WL 5617512, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2019); In re Papa John’s Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No.
3:18-CV-00825-JHM, 2019 WL 5386484, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019).
200. See Ogden v. Little Caeser Enterprises, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 622, 634–40 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
201. See Arrington v. Burger King Worldwide, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1331–32 (S.D. Fl. 2020).
202. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, supra note 132, at 1–2, 7–9; Defendant Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of
Its Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 9, Fuentes, 2019 WL 7584654 (No. 18-5174).
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Litigants and courts value guidance from the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, one
of the federal antitrust enforcement arms, due in part to the nuanced economic
and market analysis involved in antitrust law.203 For example, although the
DOJ’s merger guidelines do not bind courts’ review of proposed mergers, courts
have viewed the guidelines as a helpful framework for their own analyses.204 A
2019 analysis examined thirty-two filings, including amicus briefs and
statements of interest, filed by the DOJ under the leadership of then-Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust, Makan Delrahim.205 Delrahim explained that the
purpose of the filings is to “address developments in the case law earlier and
more frequently, offering [the DOJ] the opportunity to have an outsized impact
with [the DOJ’s] resources.”206 Of nineteen cases that had been resolved at the
time of the analysis, the courts agreed with the DOJ’s position in eight and
disagreed with the DOJ’s position in five.207
The DOJ’s position on franchise no-poach agreements, as asserted in its
Statement of Interest, does not bind the courts.208 Courts should reject the DOJ’s
position that not all franchise no-poach agreements are per se illegal because of
the flawed reasoning that underlies that argument. The application of the per se
standard to franchise no-poach agreements is not only supported by section 1
precedent, but it is also supported by policy considerations.

III. THE FUTURE OF FRANCHISE NO-POACH AGREEMENTS
Although the dispute regarding the appropriate standard of review for nopoach agreements may seem like a mere nuance in antitrust law, the resolution
of the dispute has important implications for workers in the United States. Courts
must consider the ways in which the use of no-poach agreements in the franchise

203. See Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust
Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 772, 780 (2006); see also Leah Brannon & Kathleen Bradish, The
Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Can the Courts Be Persuaded?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2010, at 1,
1–2.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Although, as the Justice
Department acknowledges, the court is not bound by, and owes no particular deference to, the [Merger]
Guidelines, this court considers them a helpful tool, in view of the many years of thoughtful analysis they
represent, for analyzing proposed mergers.”).
205. DOJ Weighs in on More Antitrust Cases, With Mixed Success, MLEX (Oct. 1, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center/editors-picks/area-of-expertise/antitrust/doj-weighs-in-on-moreantitrust-cases-with-mixed-success#:~:text=The%20Justice%20Department%20has%20been,according%
20to%20an%20MLex%20analysis. In the other six cases, the court neither adopted nor rejected the DOJ’s
position. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Conrad v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No. 318CV00133NJRRJD, 2019 WL 2754864, at *3
(S.D. Ill. May 21, 2019) (“The DOJ’s Antitrust Division is certainly a titan in this arena and carries a considerable
burden in interpreting open questions in antitrust jurisprudence—that is without question. But DOJ is not the
ultimate authority on the subject . . . .”); In re Papa John’s Emp. & Franchisee Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:18CV-00825-JHM, 2019 WL 5386484, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019) (“The Court will not, however, abdicate
its duty to apply the law to the facts of this case by blindly deferring to the DOJ’s analysis of distinct factual
scenarios.”).
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industry yields tangible effects on American workers and the economy in
general. The courts are equipped to resolve the franchise no-poach problem;
however, other non-judicial solutions may provide more immediate and
effective results.
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
When determining the appropriate standard under which franchise nopoach agreements should be reviewed, courts should account for the public
policy implications of their decisions. The no-poach agreements at issue here
harm employees by effectively suppressing wages, reducing their bargaining
power, and restricting their mobility.209 Although protecting employees in the
labor market is not the sole purpose of antitrust law, antitrust law is an important
tool for ensuring healthy competition for American workers.210 Antitrust law
aims to encourage free markets with procompetitive benefits to both consumers
and employees.211 Its ultimate goal is to not only retroactively punish antitrust
violations but to prevent them altogether.212 Using the per se standard to analyze
no-poach agreements will prevent franchisors from using these agreements
altogether and thus encourage robust competition in the labor market.
No-poach agreements expand the already existing problem with labor
mobility in America. Over the past few decades, American employees were less
likely “to move to new places and start new jobs.”213 One explanation for a lack
of mobility in the labor market is a lack of competition.214 When employees have
more options for employment, employers will compete more effectively for their
labor.215
No-poach agreements harm employees by tending to deprive them of better
job growth or mobility opportunities.216 A franchisee employee may choose to
seek employment at a different franchisee location for a variety of reasons. An
employee may wish to move to a franchisee location at which he or she is
scheduled to work more hours per week, is given a more flexible schedule, or

209. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 46, at 6–7.
210. Statement of Doha Mekki, supra note 1, at 1.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 5–6 (“[The 2016 Joint Policy Statement] affirms that workers are entitled to the benefits of a
competitive market for their labor, and also encourages strong compliance programs and safeguards to prevent
antitrust violations. The Guidance was intended to reach an audience that is broader than just antitrust
practitioners and in order to increase deterrence, which helps preserve resources.”).
213. Antitrust and Economic Opportunity: Competition in Labor Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Com. & Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of Noah
Phillips, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
214. Letter from Rohit Chopra, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1–3 (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1544564/chopra_-_letter_to_doj_on_labor_market_competition.pdf.
215. Id. at 1.
216. KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 46, at 6.
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offered promotional opportunities.217 Additionally, depending on external
factors, employees may need to work at a franchisee location that is
geographically more convenient. The no-poach agreements restrict workers’
outside options and thus limit their job growth and opportunities.218
A lack of worker mobility is a contributing factor to the long-term
macroeconomic trend of stagnant wages and rising inequality across the
country.219 In 2017, the national unemployment rate reached a sixteen-year low
and the number of available jobs reached an all-time high; however, wage
growth has remained fairly stagnant.220 When labor is “perfectly” mobile, the
labor supply is elastic and thus low wages will prompt employee migration.221
In a normal labor market without restraints like no-poach agreements,
employees seeking higher wages will either solicit a raise from their employer
or seek employment elsewhere.222 The use of no-poach agreements, however,
has distorted the price-setting mechanisms that would otherwise apply in a
normal labor market.223 Analogous to the way that price-fixing agreements
produce higher prices for consumers, no-poach agreements produce lower
wages for employees.224 Just as decreased competition in a product market
enables firms to raise prices without a decrease in demand, restricted
competition in a labor market enables employers to suppress workers’ wages
without fear of them leaving.225
No-poach agreements are especially problematic because they pose
potential wage suppression for individuals who are already paid low wages. Nopoach agreements are common in the fast-food industry.226 The average fastfood worker earns $300 per week before taxes.227 According to a 2014 study,
12% of workers earning less than $40,000 annually with below-college-level

217. See, e.g., Amended Class Action Complaint at 16–17, Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C
4857, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-04857). Plaintiff alleged that she began training
courses to become eligible for the general manager position. Id. at 16. After her employer found out that she was
pregnant, the employer cancelled the training. Id. When Plaintiff sought employment at another McDonald’s
restaurant location that offered higher wages, a corporate employee informed her that the franchisee could not
even interview her for the position because of the no-poach agreement in effect. Id. at 17.
218. KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 46, at 6.
219. See Abrams, supra note 17; see also COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES 1 (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf
[hereinafter COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF].
220. Abrams, supra note 17.
221. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 41, at 9–10.
222. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 219, at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 3.
225. Id. at 2.
226. Catherine E. Schaefer, Note, Disagreeing Over Agreements: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of NoPoaching Agreements in the Franchise Sector, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2287 (2019).
227. Abrams, supra note 17.
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education were restricted by non-compete or no-poach covenants.228 No-poach
agreements between franchisees also threaten wages by facilitating
opportunities for additional collusion.229 When no-poach agreements are in
place, franchisees are in a stronger position to expressly fix wages.230
In an already unequal power dynamic between an employer and
employee,231 no-poach agreements provide unfair bargaining power to
employers at the expense of the employees.232 In a labor market free from
restraints, employees are generally free to seek new employment opportunities
if they are dissatisfied at a current workplace.233 If their wages are suppressed,
employees can seek work with a higher-paying employer.234 If their hours are
cut or if they are not offered adequate benefits, employees can seek work with
an employer who offers a more attractive benefits package and a flexible
schedule.235 However, these no-poach agreements limit employees’ ability to
respond to inadequacies or changes in their workplace. Employers have unfair
leverage over their employees because employees implicated by these
provisions cannot easily transfer to a different location within the same franchise
system.236 The employers experience less pressure to offer competitive wages,
benefits, or work schedules because the risk of losing a significant number of
employees is low.237 The no-poach agreements allow employers to keep labor
costs low at the expense of their employees.238 Additionally, forces that impede
labor mobility can contribute to the market power that some of the firms already
have.239
Furthermore, the individuals who are directly inhibited by these
agreements, the employees themselves, are often unaware that these provisions
even exist.240 Most employees never see the no-poach provisions and thus are
not aware of them until they are actually restricted by them, because these
provisions are contained within the franchise agreements.241 The lack of
transparency regarding the no-poach agreements further distorts the bargaining
power between the employee and employer.

228. Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 536, 545 (2018).
229. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 41, at 13.
230. Id.
231. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 219, at 1, 4.
232. Id.
233. American Antitrust Institute Letter, supra note 14, at 10.
234. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 41, at 14.
235. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 34, at 6–7.
236. See Naidu et al., supra note 228, at 545, 553.
237. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 219, at 5.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1, 4.
240. Statement of Rahul Rao, supra note 74, at 2.
241. Id.; see also Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 217, at 17. Plaintiff was unaware that she
could not seek employment at another McDonald’s franchise and only found out once she tried to apply for a
position at a different location. Id.
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B. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Without an effective solution, the use of no-poach agreements will
continue to harm employees and perpetuate economic inequality. The treatment
of no-poach agreements in antitrust law will likely continue to develop in court,
inviting different theories on the correct approaches that courts should take. The
nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship itself has prompted various
defensive arguments which attempt to shield, and in some cases have
successfully shielded, these entities from liability. Solutions to this problem are
available through each of the three branches of the federal government—the
courts, the executive branch through the DOJ, and the legislature. States can also
address the problem through legislation or effective enforcement efforts.
First, courts should reject the DOJ’s position and decline to apply the rule
of reason standard to franchise no-poach agreements. Given the prevalence of
these no-poach agreements in the franchise sector and other industries242 and
their harmful effects, litigation will likely continue. If courts apply the rule of
reason as the uniform standard under which no-poach agreements must be
analyzed, plaintiffs are unlikely to receive any meaningful remedy for their
injuries. One of the most influential economists and jurists Richard Posner once
described the rule of reason as “little more than a euphemism for nonliability.”243
Ninety-seven percent of all antitrust cases examined under the rule of reason
standard are dismissed at the pleading stage, largely due to the high burden of
proof that plaintiffs must meet.244
The per se rule allows courts and victims to preserve resources and avoid
complicated and expensive litigation. When the per se rule applies, plaintiffs do
not have to conduct a costly economic investigation into the industry in order to
demonstrate that a particular restraint is unreasonable.245 The per se standard
achieves a judicial economy by allowing courts, drawing on their experience, to
predict with confidence that the restraint will produce anticompetitive effects.246
If the courts take a clear stance on the issue of franchise no-poach agreements,
franchise systems can modify their franchise agreements and practices
accordingly.
Second, the DOJ should reconsider the position it articulated in its
Statement of Interest in light of existing section 1 jurisprudence, successful
enforcement efforts by state attorneys general, and important policy objectives.
If the DOJ were to adopt a clear stance on this issue and advocate for the per se
rule, courts may be less reluctant to determine the appropriate standard of
review. A revised position on the issue would also allow the DOJ to reconcile
242. KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 46, at 7–8.
243. Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
244. Masterman, supra note 35, at 1394.
245. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343–45 (1982) (explaining that the policy
behind the per se standard is to achieve judicial economy).
246. Id.
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the tension between its franchise no-poach position and its previous 2016 Joint
Policy with the FTC.
Lastly, legislation is likely the most effective means to eliminate the use of
no-poach agreements and adequately address the exploitation of buyer power in
labor markets. In 2018, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Cory Booker attempted
to do so by introducing legislation titled the “End Employer Collusion Act.”247
The bill prohibits no-poach agreements entirely, providing a private right of
action and giving the FTC enforcement authority.248 The bill was reintroduced
to the Senate in July of 2019, but further action has yet to be taken.249 If enacted,
this legislation could enable federal enforcement that could supplement
enforcement efforts at the state level.
Even if efforts at legislation fail at the federal level, states could also raise
standards for franchise workers by banning no-poach agreements. While no state
has adopted such a law, action by even some states could incentivize franchise
systems to eliminate the use of these agreements entirely. Although state laws
could differ in scope and conflict with those of other states, franchise systems
may likely remove no-poach provisions from their agreements to avoid nopoach litigation entirely. As demonstrated by the large number of franchise
systems that have already agreed to end their use of no-poach agreements in
connection with settlements with state enforcement authorities,250 legislation at
either the state or federal level could likely curb the use of these no-poach
provisions entirely.

CONCLUSION
Although no-poach agreements have been in use for decades, their future
in antitrust law remains uncertain. In developing antitrust jurisprudence, courts
can seek guidance from the agencies that are responsible for enforcing antitrust
laws. However, when the major authorities in the world of antitrust law disagree,
courts are left to analyze a complex issue with conflicting guidance. The courts’
approaches to franchise no-poach cases will have far-reaching implications that
significantly impact workers. Although the DOJ is an important actor in antitrust

247. End Employer Collusion Act, S. 2480, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Press Release, Off. of U.S. Sen.
Cory Booker, Booker, Warren Introduce Bill to Crack Down on Collusive “No Poach” Agreements (Feb. 28,
2018), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-warren-introduce-bill-to-crack-down-on-collusiveand-quotno-poach-and-quot-agreements.
248. S. 2480.
249. End Employer Collusion Act, S. 2215, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Actions Overview: S.2215—116th
Congress (2019–2020), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2215/
actions?KWICView=false (last visited May 21, 2021).
250. See Press Release, Wash. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Ferguson Announces Fast-Food Chains Will
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law and enforcement, its recent position on the issue overlooks key features of
the franchise industry and has bolstered the franchisors’ defenses in no-poach
litigation. If implemented, the DOJ’s proposed standard could insulate violators
of antitrust laws designed to protect against the dangers of corporate power.
Courts should reject the DOJ’s position that the nature of the franchise
industry warrants a departure from the rule that no-poach agreements are per se
illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The DOJ should revisit its position
in its Statement of Interest and advocate for a bright-line per se rule for all nopoach agreements, including those implemented by franchise systems.
Alternatively, legislation at the state or federal level could eliminate any
ambiguity by conclusively prohibiting no-poach agreements in the franchise
industry.

1604

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

***

[Vol. 72:1573

